ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION

51
Start-ups do not emerge in a vacuum. They build on the pre-existing resource constellations, activity 52 patterns and a web of actors in the network (Snehota, 2011) . To survive in this network, start-ups have 53 to embed themselves in the established developing, producing and using setting (Håkansson, Ford, 54 Gadde, Snehota, & Waluszewski, 2009 ). It is not sufficient for a start-up to just develop new ideas.
55
These ideas have to be embedded in the producing and using setting to create any desirable economic 56 effect (Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2007) . Consequently, a start-up is defined as a company that is not 57 yet established in the pre-existing developing, producing and using setting. In these settings, the value 58 of a start-up's resources depends on their connections to the resources of others, and the outcome of its 59 activities is interdependent with its counterparties' activities. Therefore, start-ups are dependent on the 60 skills, resources, actions and intentions of other organisations (Håkansson et al., 2009 ). This 61 interdependence implies that organisations are interactive instead of being independently developed 62 and implemented (Håkansson & Ford, 2002) . The Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) 63 approach defines interaction as "a constant process of action and reaction involving activities, actors 64 and resources" (Håkansson et al., 2009, p. 197) . Interaction may be unplanned and unintentional, but 65 it is also the process through which actors try to achieve their aims. The deliberate actions of a start-up 66 influence the extent to which its partners perceive the outcomes of the relationship as either positive or 67 negative. Subsequently, this affects its partners' willingness to take action to either support or 68 counteract a start-up's action and the potential outcomes (Das & Teng, 2002; Ring & Van de Ven, 69 1994) . Therefore, start-ups need to know how to act so as to embed themselves in the pre-existing 70 network and to benefit from the resources, initiatives and activities of others (Håkansson & Ford, 71 2002; Lui & Ngo, 2005) .
Yet start-ups face unique challenges in interaction. Their lack of experience, reputation and resources 74 makes it more difficult to know how to act in a relationship (Ariño, Ragozzino, & Reuer, 2008) . 75
Nevertheless, start-ups contribute their own resources and activities to a relationship, just like any 76 other organisation. Moreover, they are able to control, change and adapt these resources and activities. 77
As a result, start-ups have room for taking action and making changes to reach their aims in interaction 78 (Håkansson, Olsen, & Bakken, 2013) . They need "to act, to try to control, 79 to suggest ideas and initiative, to set limits and to seek opportunities" (Harrison, Holmen, & Pedersen, 80 2010, p. 948) . Consequently, there is an increasing interest in how start-ups interact with the 81 organisations in their network. Within the IMP approach scholars have researched how start-ups 82 initiate new relationships with customers (La Rocca, Ford, & Snehota, 2013) . Moreover, it was 83 investigated how a small company should interact in its business network (Raesfeld & Roos, 2008) . 84
Furthermore, the patterns of start-ups' network development have been studied (Aaboen, Dubois, & 85 Lind, 2011 . However, the greater part of the IMP research deals with firms that are well 86 established in their networks and enjoy long-term, close relationships. In comparison, there are only a 87 few studies on the initiation of relationships, especially by start-ups. 88 89
Outside the IMP approach, there is increasing interest in the specific actions that start-ups take in their 90 relationships. For example, Thorgren, Wincent, and Boter (2012) demonstrated that small firms are 91 more likely to comply with group norms than large firms. Also, Ariño et al. (2008) found that 92 entrepreneurial firms are more likely to avoid the problem of governance misalignment than 93 established companies. These previous studies addressed a single type of action in each paper, i.e. 94 compliance and avoidance. Yet neither took other possible types of actions, such as defiance or 95 manipulation, into account. This focus on just one type of action limits our understanding of how a 96 start-up uses different types of actions over time (Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010) . Organisations take a 97 variety of actions over time to achieve their goals. At one point in time, a start-up may support the 98 actions of their partners to retain their goodwill. At another point in time, it needs to confront some 99 aspects of the relationship to improve efficiency in activities and create a development path for 100 resources (Håkansson et al., 2009) . Therefore, the actions of start-ups should be analysed by studying 101 the way in which an action occurs in relation to other actions preceding and following it (Lui & Ngo, 102 2005) . Secondly, a one-sided focus on organisational action restricts our insight into how the actions 103 of start-ups interact with their partners' actions and in turn affect the counterparties involved, the 104 relationship and the network. In a relationship, organisational action always takes place during 105 interaction with the counterparty. Consequently, the freedom of an organisation to take action is 106 limited and the outcomes of an action are not unequivocally related to the action of a single 107 organisation (Håkansson et al., 2009) . Therefore, the action of start-ups should be characterised by the 108 unique set of interaction patterns created by the actions and reactions that go back and forth between 109 them and their partners (Lui & Ngo, 2005) . 110 111
In conclusion, the quest for explaining start-ups' actions has been to focus on how start-ups interact 112 with their partners, and to propose process-focused explanations in their attempt to embed themselves 113 in a pre-existing network (Snehota, 2011) . Therefore, the aim of this paper is to study how a start-up 114 interacts with its partners over time in order to embed itself in the established developing, producing 115 and using setting. For this purpose, a case study was conducted on a Dutch start-up. This start-up 116 collaborates with several organisations to develop a new medical device for the treatment of diabetes.
117
Longitudinal data was collected from both the start-up and its partners to capture the interactive and 118 dynamic nature of organisational action. The paper establishes a theoretical framework based on 119 relevant, current literature. In the Methodology section, a brief description is given of the research 120 design. This is followed by a detailed description of the evolution of the start-up's key relationships.
121
Drawing from the case description, the start-up's and its partners' actions over time are identified, 122
analysed and compared. In the Discussion, the findings of this research are compared to the theoretical 123 framework developed in the next section. The paper ends with a short conclusion, and the theoretical 124 and practical implications of this paper. 125 126
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
128
A series of sequential episodes represent the interaction process
129
Interaction in business relationships is a process that is always in a state of ongoing change. All parties 130 will continually make adjustments to the specific relationship as a result of their extensive interaction 131 at the actor, resource and activity levels (Håkansson et al., 2009; Snehota, 2011) . Consequently, 132 relationships are intrinsically dynamic (Snehota, 2011) . Dynamics can be considered as a series of 133 sequential 'episodes' within a continuous interaction process. Episodes are related to each other 134 because interaction is affected by what has taken place previously, and by the perceptions and 135 expectations of future interaction (Ford, Gadde, Håkansson, Snehota, & Waluszewski, 2008; 136 Håkansson et al., 2009) . A single episode can be interpreted as a specific point of interaction in time in 137 which two or more organisations are dealing with particular matters. Each episode follows its own 138 logic for the start-up: it involves specific partners, it deals with certain aspects of the relationship and 139 takes place in a particular context. Most interaction episodes will be perceived as a repetitive sequence 140 of 'normal' interactions as long as the counterparties comply with their formal and informal 141 agreements (Håkansson et al., 2009; Lui & Ngo, 2005) . For a start-up and its partners, these 142 interactions are part of everyday life: a normal flow of orders, payments and deliveries. In such a 143 situation, their approach to interaction is often the unconscious result of inertia and simply continues 144 the status quo. As a result, the process of interaction occurs routinely without deliberate effort or 145 planning by any of the organisations involved Håkansson et al., 2009 ). 146 147
External and internal triggers that change the opportunities for future interactions
148
Many events occur as a start-up and its partners interact, but these are not all perceived as important.
149
However, events that change the nature of the possible future interaction from either of the 150 counterparties' perspectives may disrupt the otherwise repetitive sequence of 'normal' interactions 151 Lui & Ngo, 2005) . Such events may arise from either inside or outside the 152 interaction context (Ariño & de la Torre, 1998; Medlin, 2004) . Internally, a start-up and its partners 153 continuously monitor the specific relationship to judge its value (Ariño & de la Torre, 1998; Lui & 154 Ngo, 2005; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) . These assessments involve considerations of potential, costs, 155 portfolio and network position, time and the view of the relationship held by a counterparty (Ford & 156 Mouzas, 2008) . A similar re-evaluation process takes place when external changes in environmental 157 conditions or the strategic context alter the relationship's expected value to a counterparty. When 158 internal assessments and external events influence the expected value of the relationship to a start-up 159 and its partners (Ariño & de la Torre, 1998) , it will have an impact on their judgement of the activity 160 T.Oukes & A. von Raesfeld links, resource ties and actor bonds. A trigger can be considered as an element of newness -internally 161 or externally -in interaction that constrains or expands the opportunities for future interaction.
162
Organisations have to continuously adapt to -often unexpected -internal and external elements of 163 newness in their relationships . Such adaptations involve the two partners taking 164 specific action towards each other (Lui & Ngo, 2005; Parkhe, 1998) . These actions help to restore a 165 new repetitive sequence of 'normal' interactions (Ariño et al., 2008; Ford & Mouzas, 2008; Medlin, 166 2004) . In this situation, action is often in line with a clear goal or strategy followed by one or both 167 counterparties. It may involve extensive planning, development, negotiation, bargaining or conflict 168 . As the action taken during this period of change will broaden or narrow the options 169 for future development, a start-up will frequently have to consider its actions (Ford & Mouzas, 2008; 170 Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2013) . 171 172
Modes of interaction to consciously affect interaction
173
As explained previously, strategic management researchers studying organisational action in 174 relationships (e.g. Ariño et al., 2008; Lui & Ngo, 2005; Thorgren et al., 2012; Tjemkes & Furrer, 175 2010) assumed that organisations are autonomous in how they choose to act and how their actions 176 result in certain outcomes for them. Moreover, these researchers presumed that organisations can and 177 do behave purposefully to achieve these outcomes. However, the IMP approach has shown that 178 organisational acting is never one-sided. As a result, outcomes are not unequivocally related to an 179 organisation's behaviour. Instead, the outcomes of an actor's actions arise from the action-reaction 180 loops of both counterparties in the relationship regardless of their intent (Håkansson et al., 2009 ).
181
Although start-ups cannot determine the outcome of a relationship autonomously through their 182 behaviour, they do seek to behave purposefully. They tend to act in a very self-conscious way, trying 183 to force their counterparties to adapt to their intent (Aaboen et al., 2011 (Aaboen et al., , 2013 Håkansson et al., 2009; 184 Harrison et al., 2010; La Rocca et al., 2013) . Therefore, it is still relevant to approach start-ups in 185 terms of their acting in relationships. Yet in this paper, the organisational actions defined by strategic 186 management researchers are considered 'modes of interaction'. Mode of interaction refers to the way 187 in which an organisation consciously attempts to affect interaction. This definition takes into account 188 that organisations are not autonomous in their actions and that only via a process of interaction 189 between two or more counterparties, actions do result in outcomes. The various modes of interaction 190 are further explained in the next section.
192
Interaction: the action-reaction loops between counterparties
193
During an interaction episode, a number of 'action-reaction' loops are set in motion (Ariño & de la 194 Torre, 1998) . Therefore, Lui and Ngo (2005) suggest that each relationship is characterised by a 195 unique interaction process created by the actions and reactions that go back and forth between the 196 partners. The interaction process is a process of change that occurs between the counterparties over 197 time. This process and its content may be separated from the two organisations themselves. The 198 interaction process is influenced by how both counterparties act and react as well as the process of 199 interaction itself. As a consequence, the interaction process derives its unique character from the two 200 involved organisations but develops in a way that is not fully controlled by either of them. Thus, what 201 an organisation can do or accomplishes becomes the outcome of the process of interaction, action and 202 reaction, move and countermove Håkansson et al., 2009) .
The outcome of interaction on the actors involved, their resources and activities 205
The outcome of the interaction process can be defined as the effect on the actors involved in it, the 206 resources they exchange and the activities they perform. Interaction always affects the actors, 207 resources and activities involved in it since it injects some novelty into the relationship. However, a 208 single episode will affect each of those involved in it differently, and therefore will be differently 209 interpreted by each of them Håkansson et al., 2009) . In general, interactions with a 210 'converting' character stimulate further development of activity links, resource ties and actor bonds. In 211 contrast, actions with an 'inhibiting' character limit the progress of the relationship (Edvardsson, 212 Holmlund, & Strandvik, 2008; Elo & Törnroos, 2005) . Each interaction will affect subsequent 213 interaction between the counterparties and others in multiple directions. This multidimensionality 214 makes outcomes difficult to interpret Håkansson et al., 2009 ). 215 In summary, Figure 1 shows the process of interaction between a start-up and its partners. The arrows 217 from the trigger to both counterparties represent that any event -whether external or internal -that 218 changes the opportunity for further interaction may trigger action from either partner. The arrows from 219 the start-up and its partners to the spiral represent the modes of interaction to further interaction of 220 both counterparties. 
Action in an interactive process: modes of interaction
240
The modes of interaction are identified based on the work of Lui and Ngo (2005) and Tjemkes and 241 Furrer (2010) . They developed typologies of actions that organisations take in their relationships.
242
These typologies are based on research into the long-term relationships between established 243
organisations. Yet recent studies have found that single actions of these typologies also apply to start-244 ups (Ariño et al., 2008; Thorgren et al., 2012) . Therefore, it is assumed that these action typologies 245 are also useful for studying the emerging relationship between start-ups and their counterparties. Yet 246 in contrast to previous work on a start-up's actions in relationships, this paper aims to identify the 247 variety of interaction modes used by a start-up. As explained previously, a start-up will never use only 248 one type of action. Instead it will use various modes of interaction: at the same time in various 249 relationships and at various times in the same relationship. Therefore, a focus on a single type of 250 action would limit our understanding of the range of alternative interaction modes that are available to 251 and are used by start-ups (Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010) . Next, the typologies of Lui and Ngo (2005) and 252 Tjemkes and Furrer (2010) are explained, compared and integrated to identify the possible range of 253 interaction modes that start-ups and their partners may use in their relationships. 254 255
A typology including five strategic responses to external institutional processes was developed by 256
Oliver (1991). Lui and Ngo (2005) show that Oliver's typology can be extended to cooperative 257 relationships by conceptualising an organisation's action as exerting external pressure on its 258 counterparty. Specifically, they propose five types of organisational actions in a cooperative context: 259 acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy and manipulate. Acquiesce refers to the compliance of an 260 organisation with the request or action of the counterparty even against its own short-term interests.
261
Organisations do this either to strategically improve the relationship or simply out of habit.
262
Compromise consists of the partial conformance of an organisation to the demand or action of its 263 counterparty. The organisation negotiates to seek concessions to partially change its counterparty's 264 demand or action. Avoid involves the lack of intention of an organisation to fulfil the counterparty's 265 request or action. Yet the organisation typically conceals this non-compliance by reducing contact so 266 that it can delay its response. Defy refers to an organisation's dismissal of the demand or action of its 267 T.Oukes & A. von Raesfeld counterparty by rejecting and denouncing the relationship. In extreme cases, this may lead to 268 termination of the relationship. Manipulate consists of the attempt of an organisation to influence, 269 shape, change or redefine the demand or request of its counterparty with the aim of overpowering it 270 (Lui & Ngo, 2005) .
Similarly, Hirschman (1970) proposed a typology in which exit, voice and loyalty represent three 273 response strategies to decline in firms, organisations and states. Farrell (1983) extended this typology 274 with a fourth strategy -neglect -to form the ELVN (exit-voice-loyalty-neglect) typology. Several 275 studies have used this typology to study response strategies in a cooperative context (e.g. Geyskens & 276 Steenkamp, 2000; Ping, 1993 Ping, , 1999 . In the relationship context, the four EVLN response strategies 277 are defined as follows. Exit indicates the willingness of an organisation to discontinue a current 278 relationship. Relationship termination is the ultimate response to a troublesome situation (Ping, 1999) .
279
Voice refers to the attempt of an organisation to overcome an adverse situation by considering the 280 concerns of its counterparty as well as its own. The organisation and its counterparty cooperatively 281 discuss the issue with the intent to develop mutually satisfactory solutions. Loyalty implies an 282 organisation's ignorance of a negative situation in the hope that it will resolve by itself (Ping, 1993) .
283
Neglect consists of an organisation allowing its relationship to decline. The organisation expends little 284 effort in maintaining the relationship. Moreover, solutions to solve the undesirable situation are 285 ignored (Ping, 1993 (Ping, , 1999 Pressey & Qiu, 2007) . Tjemkes and Furrer (2010) name the EVLN type of 286 voice 'considerate' because it mostly suggests a positive approach involving the constructive 287 discussion of the adverse situation. In addition, they extend the ELVN typology with three additional 288 responses: creative voice, aggressive voice and opportunism. Creative voice refers to the attempt of an 289 organisation and its counterparty to overcome an adverse situation by the generation of novel and 290 potentially innovative solutions beyond the scope of their original agreement. Aggressive voice 291
consists of the persistent effort of an organisation to solve an undesirable situation without regard for 292 the ideas and preferences of the counterparty. The organisation coerces its counterparty into a one-side 293 solution without trying to avoid conflict. Opportunism occurs when an organisation tries to maximize 294 its own short-term interest at the expense of its partners. The organisation benefits from the 295 relationship in ways that are explicitly or implicitly forbidden within the relationship.
297
There are clearly similarities between the typologies developed by Lui and Ngo (2005) on the one 298 hand and Tjemkes and Furrer (2010) on the other. Firstly, compromise and considerate voice both 299 refer to the active and constructive negotiation between an organisation and its counterparty in a 300 relationship-preserving manner. Secondly, avoid consists of neglecting to react to an emerging issue 301 with an organisation's counterparty. Tjemkes and Furrer (2010) argue that the issue can resolve by 302 itself (loyalty) or the relationship will start to deteriorate (neglect). Thirdly, defy is similar to 303 opportunistic behaviour depicted in transaction cost theory (Lui & Ngo, 2005) , and therefore is similar 304 to opportunism as well. As defiance may lead to termination of the relationship in extreme cases, it is 305 also closely linked with exit. Fourthly, manipulate and aggressive voice both involve the forceful 306 effort of an organisation to change its relationship without taking the interests of its counterparty into 307 account. However, the action acquiesce proposed by Lui and Ngo (2005) and the response strategy 308 create described by Tjemkes and Furrer (2010) do not match any of the actions from the other 309 typology. 310 311
From this explanation and comparison, it can be concluded that a start-up and its partners can choose 312 from six modes of interaction: create, acquiesce, compromise, manipulate, avoid and defy. The first 313 mode of interaction is termed 'create' and relates to the creative voice response strategy described by 314 Tjemkes and Furrer (2010) . The five other modes of interaction refer to the actions defined by Lui and 315 Ngo (2005) . Compromise and manipulate find their topological equivalent in typology of Tjemkes and 316
Furrer (2010): considerate voice and aggressive voice respectively. Yet the labels of Lui and Ngo 317 (2005) are used because they appear to be more action-oriented. Furthermore, it is acknowledged the 318 latter two modes of interaction -avoid and defy -have a two-dimensional outcome. When the action 319 of the counterparty or the adverse situation is avoided the issue dissolves naturally or the relationship 320 declines. When the action of the counterparty or the troublesome situation is defied, then this may lead 321 to opportunism or exit (Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010 (Bizzi & Langley, 2012; Halinen, Medlin, & Törnroos, 2012; Langley, 339 Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 2013) . Organisational action takes place in an ongoing process of 340 interaction as exemplified in Figure 1 . Thus, by taking time as the central element of study, this paper 341 aims to offer an essential contribution to organisational and management knowledge that is not 342 available from most variance-based generalisations.
344
Subject of study 345 Process research methodologies are often based on qualitative case studies. Case studies enable the 346 researchers to capture the nuances of processes in and around organisations (Bizzi & Langley, 2012; 347 Langley et al., 2013) . Therefore, they correspond well to a research approach that emphasises process 348 questions. Consequently, the empirical data collection involved an in-depth case study of a start-up 349 and its partners in the medical device business. 
Data collection
370
Longitudinal data is a key feature of process research because it is necessary to observe how processes 371 unfold over time (Langley et al., 2013) . Therefore, a retrospective analysis was conducted from the 372 start of the project in 2004 until April 2013. Afterwards, the start-up was followed in real time until 373 the end of December 2014. The combination of the retrospective analysis with real-time longitudinal 374 research allows both the detection of substantial changes in relationships over long time periods and 375 the ongoing development of relationships as they emerge (Bizzi & Langley, 2012; Leonard-Barton, 376 T.Oukes & A. von Raesfeld 1990 ). The analysis is based on empirical data collection from three different sources: semi-structured 377 interviews, observations and archival documents. On the one hand, this is to be able to capture the full 378 complexity of the interaction in the relationship between the start-up and it partners (Bizzi & Langley, 379 2012) ; on the other, to eliminate the risk that a finding is found by chance alone, which is crucial since 380 this study is based on a single case (Doorewaard & Verschuren, 2010; Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 381 2008) . Firstly, direct passive and active participant observations were carried out during one of the 382 researchers' residence at the start-up for on average of two days a week from April 2013 until 383
December 2014. The prolonged involvement of the researcher in the processes studied enabled her to 384 build interaction expertise and provided close access to events and actions (Langley et al., 2013) . 385
Moreover, it allowed the researcher to discover the discrepancies between what participants say they 386 do and what they actually do. To reduce the researcher's hindsight bias, once every week a short 387 evaluation report was written based on the field notes taken during that week. Secondly, archival 388 documents, such as non-disclosure agreements, project descriptions and patents, are used to minimise 389 interviewee hindsight bias and the limitations of memory recall (Langley et al., 2013) . 390 391
Finally, fifteen semi-structured interviews were held with key individuals from the start-up and its 392 partners at two moments in time as shown in Table 2 . Although collecting data on both sides of the 393 relationship at two moments in time is challenging, it allows the researchers to capture the interactive 394 nature of action: in other words, the pattern of action and reaction between the start-up and its partners 395 over time. Moreover, the various perceptions of triggers, actions, reactions and outcomes can be 396
considered. This complements existing cross-sectional research that collects data from a single 397 organisation per relationship (Ariño et al., 2008; Lui & Ngo, 2005; Thorgren et al., 2012) . The 398 selection of interviewees was based on: (1) direct interaction with the other partner(s) in the 399 relationship; and (2) the direct involvement in the development of the start-up's artificial pancreas. 400
The first set of interviews was held in June and July 2013, while the second set followed in December 401 2014. Each interview lasted approximately between 30 and 100 minutes. The first set of interviews 402 was structured around: (1) how and why the start-up and its partner initiated the relationship; (2) what 403 the goals of the relationship were and how the start-up and its partner ensured that these goals were 404 achieved; and (3) how resources were exchanged between the start-up and its partner. The second set 405 of interviews focused on: (1) how the relationship between the start-up and its partner had evolved 406 since the first interview; (2) how the goals of the relationship were revised and how the start-up and its 407 partner ensured that these goals were achieved developed; and (3) how the resource exchange between 408 the start-up and its partner had been modified. Then the interviewee was asked to identify: (1) 409 important changes in the relationship; (2) how the start-up and its partners acted during these changes; 410 (3) why they acted the way they did; and (4) how this affected their relationship. However, the 411 interviews were flexible enough to leave room for discussion and allowed interviewees to give 412 examples and expand on important events and situations. The interviews involved sensitive, 413 confidential, and political topics regarding the relationship with the start-up. Consequently, it was 414 important to maintain confidentially. Therefore, the names of organisations and interviewees were 415 made anonymous. All interviews in this research were tape-recorded and then transcribed. 416 417 < Insert 
Data analysis
420
To analyse the recorded interviews, diary and archival documents, ALTLAS.ti software was 421 employed. This software provided the tools to code the findings in the data; to evaluate the importance 422 of these findings; and visualise the complex relations between these findings. The coding was based 423 on the theoretical framework developed in the previous section that specified important concepts a 424
priori. This helped to improve the research quality as it allowed the researchers to measure concepts 425 more accurately. It is important to note that concepts are necessarily tentative in this type of study. The 426 concepts could either be validated or found to be inadequate in the context of start-ups. If the validity 427 of a concept is confirmed, then the researcher has a firmer empirical grounding for emergent theory. 428
However, if a concept is found to be inadequate, researchers can further refine emergent theory based 429 on the case study findings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gibbert et al., 2008) .
431 T.Oukes & A. von Raesfeld
The data were analysed in five consecutive phases which are summarised in Table 3. The analysis  432 started with drawing up a history of the start-up to clarify the context of the phenomena in question.
433
Secondly, the analysis focused on identifying the important interaction episodes between the start-up 434 and its partners. 'Temporal bracketing' (Langley, 1999) was used to identify comparative episodes 435 within the stream of longitudinal data. These temporal brackets were constructed as a chain of 436 episodes separated by identifiable internal or external triggers in the interaction process. Temporal 437 bracketing also enabled the identification of specific actions recurring over time (Van de Ven, 1992) . 438 Therefore, the data was coded in order to identify and categorise the actions and reactions of the start-439 up and its partners in the different episodes in the third step. The six actions adopted from Tjemkes 440
and Furrer (2010) and Lui and Ngo (2005) as defined in Table 1 were used as the coding template. In 441 the fourth phase the focus was on how the interaction process affected the perceived outcome of 442 relationship as either converting or inhibiting. As explained in the previous section, interactions with a 443 'converting' character stimulate further development of the relationship, while actions with an 444 'inhibiting' character reduce activity links, resource ties and actor bonds. However, during the analysis 445 it appeared that the partners did not always agree on the converting or inhibiting nature of the outcome 446 of the interaction episode. In addition, the partners sometimes perceived that the interaction episode 447 had both positive and negative outcomes. In these instances, the outcome of the interaction episode 448 was labelled 'mixed'. Moreover, temporal bracketing permitted us to analyse how the previous 449 episode impacts subsequent actions in the current episode (Langley et al., 2013 
RESULTS
458
The development of the start-up 459 In 2003, an entrepreneur -a diabetic patient -consulted his diabetes nurse for his annual check-up.
460
Over the years, he had become increasingly dissatisfied with the available treatment methods for his 461 disease. That evening, he developed the principle of a new system: a bi-hormonal artificial pancreas.
462
Yet the entrepreneur lacked the necessary knowledge to develop the system on his own. Therefore, he 463 mobilised the support of two friends: a diabetes nurse and a software developer. In 2004, they were 464 able to try out a first prototype of their system, which was the size of a small closet, on the 465 entrepreneur. When it turned out to work as intended, the entrepreneur tested the system on a few 466 more diabetics. The results were promising, and the friends started the development of a prototype of 467 about the size of a microwave oven. Nevertheless, the progress stagnated between 2005 and 2008 for 468 two main reasons. Firstly, the previous prototype was developed at the expense of the three friends. 469
However, these funds were insufficient to finance the development of a second prototype. approximately a laptop computer. As a consequence the start-up and the teaching hospital were able to 482 try out the system in a home-environment. Previously, the artificial pancreas could only be tested in a 483 hospital setting as it was too big to wear. The results of a two day trial -in a home-environment -484
showed that the device performed as well as the regular diabetes treatment on day one and even better 485 on day two. These promising results gave the start-up the motivation to take the project to the next 486 T.Oukes & A. Development. This funding allowed the start-up to build a fourth, even smaller, prototype of the 489 artificial pancreas that would be suitable for introduction into the market. In addition, the grant would 490 cover the cost of three additional clinical trials. Secondly, the development of the artificial pancreas 491 was given a boost when the start-up won the health foundation's audience award in 2012. This award 492 generated a lot of media attention. In this way, the project was picked up by a market leader in the 493 diabetes device market. First the market leader was just cooperating to keep track of the start-up's 494 invention, but after the promising results of a test with the artificial pancreas they wanted to intensify 495 the relationship. However, the development of the start-up's artificial pancreas did not run as smoothly 496 after 2012. The start-up and the health foundation applied for funding from the Dutch government, but 497 this application was rejected. Additionally, the start-up had an issue with the research institute because 498 the institute wished to change the agreements of the relationship but the start-up did not. Moreover, 499
there was a conflict in the European project about the quality of the work that was delivered by one of 500 the involved companies. Also, another partner decided to leave the project after one-and-a-half years. 501
In conclusion, the start-up interacted with an increasing number of partners over the years. 502
Consequently, there were more and more relationships that the start-up had to engage in and manage. 503
In some instances this had a positive effect, but in others it slowed down the development of the 504 artificial pancreas.
506
The start-up interacting with its partners 507 In this section, the interaction between the start-up and its key partners, the trigger that marked the 508 start of the interaction episode and the outcome are explained in detail. The results are summarised in 509 Table 4 for each partner in chronological order and will also be discussed in this way. One important 510 aspect of this table is that there are 'white spots'. These white spots occur when either the start-up or 511 the partner was not actively (re)acting during the interaction episode. In these episodes, one of the 512 partners came with a request, proposal or demand to which the other party reacted, but there was no 513 response from the initiator to its counterparty's reaction. 514 515 < Insert Table 4 about here > 516 517
Teaching hospital 518
In 2006, the start-up started searching for a partner to run official clinical trials. These trials were 519 necessary to advance the development of the artificial pancreas. Moreover, they were essential to gain 520 the legitimacy in the current financial, healthcare and technical network to attract additional resources 521 from other organisations, such as funding from investors or support from diabetes patient foundations.
522
In 2008, the start-up came into contact with a physician who had read an article about the start-up's 523 artificial pancreas. Although he was enthusiastic about the device, he did not have the necessary skills 524 and facilities to conduct clinical trials. Therefore, he referred the start-up to the head of the 525 diabetology group of a teaching hospital see Table 4 , Episode 1 (hereafter there is only referred to the 526 episode number). After some initial meetings to get to know each other, the start-up proposed that the 527 teaching hospital would run clinical trials in exchange for shares in the start-up. The teaching hospital 528 agreed to the type of arrangement, but wanted to cooperatively negotiate about the exact number of 529 shares in exchange for a certain amount of work. As shown in Episode 4, a conflict arose between the start-up and the software company in the 561
European project in 2014. The start-up believed that the software company was working neither 562 effectively nor efficiently. Therefore, it wanted to do the task itself, and requested a budget shift. The 563 software company denied this accusation, and therefore did not agree with the transfer of the budget.
564
In response, the start-up tried to force the software company to comply with its request. This led to the 565 conflict spiralling out of control. As a result, the software company filed a complaint to the project 566 leader. The project leader talked extensively with the partners to explain to them that it is not in the 567 project's interest for the issue to escalate to the point at which either the start-up or the software 568 company leave the project (Episode 5). Eventually, they agreed to stick to their initial agreements.
569
Although the worst part of the conflict was solved, the partners avoided further communication as 570 much as possible. This hindered the development of the portal which the software company was 571 building to monitor the performance of the artificial pancreas during clinical trials. Due to the lack of 572 communication, the portal did not satisfy the requirements of the start-up. 573 574
Also in 2014, the established industry player decided to leave the project (Episode 6). The industry 575 player was responsible for development of a stable, liquid glucagon formula. When it shut down its 576 project to develop a stable, liquid glucagon formula, there was no motivation for the industry player to 577 remain in the European project any longer. Most partners of the project were content with its leaving 578 because its budget was relatively small and they did not see any opportunity to exchange more 579 knowledge and resources. In contrast, for the start-up it resulted in the considerable challenge to find a 580 new partner. The availability of stable, liquid glucagon was crucial for the success of the artificial 581 pancreas. At that moment, glucagon was only stable for 24 hours and then has to be thrown away. In 582 contrast, the start-up needed glucagon that could be used for longer. If patients had to throw away the 583 unused glucagon every day, the costs for treatment with the artificial pancreas would become 584 unacceptable. However, as a report from the start-up stated "for the development of the glucagon we 585
[ Yet there was one problem; neither partner was willing to pay for the production costs of the glucagon 603 to be used in the trial (Episode 8). Nevertheless, they were able to create a solution by using their 604 network to find interconnections between their partners. The start-up knew an American investment 605 company which had good relations with the American glucagon company. The start-up had also 606 contact with this company that, although it was interested in the start-up's artificial pancreas, was not 607 willing to invest because it was foreign initiative. Therefore, the start-up thought it might be interested 608 in providing the funds necessary to produce the glucagon for the trial. The investment company is still 609 reviewing if it would invest its financial resources in the glucagon provider. If the investor agrees to 610 fund the joint project, then these funds would be employed to produce the glucagon. 611 612
Health foundation 613
As described in Episode 9, the entrepreneur of the start-up and the head of research the In 2013, the health foundation found a way to go around the foundation's audit committee. They 627
proposed, in collaboration with the teaching hospital and technical university, to apply for funding 628 from the Dutch government (Episode 10). After negotiating the terms of this initiative, the partners 629 agreed to pursue this initiative. For the start-up this was the best chance to obtain (albeit indirectly) 630 funding from the health foundation. Furthermore, the health foundation would be able to legitimise its 631 funding for the project to its accountants and the wider public. The proposal would be reviewed by a 632 committee of experts composed by the government. However, the funding was not granted as a result 633 of what the Dutch government regarded as a lack of evidence on the effectiveness of the artificial 634 pancreas. 635 636
Before the funding application, the research foundation started a fund-raising campaign to obtain 637 sufficient funds to finance the project. Therefore, the start-up again requested direct funding from the 638 health foundation when the application to the Dutch government was rejected (Episode 11). For the 639 same reasons as mentioned previously, the foundation declined. This did not benefit the relationship 640 between the partners. They were frustrated about the fact that both parties were willing to collaborate 641 but not able to so because of internal regulations imposed on the health foundation. Nevertheless, the 642 start-up exerted pressure on the foundation using as leverage the funds that had already been raised to 643 finance the rejected project (Episode 12). As a consequence of what it regarded as manipulative action, 644 the foundation reduced its contact with the start-up. The head of research of the health foundation 645 stated "when it turned out that it [the project application] was not successful, it [the relationship with 646 the start-up] retreated into the background. And I no longer followed the developments closely." 647 648
Research institute 649
In 2012, the health foundation organized a meeting for research institutes and industry to discuss the 650 development of new glucose sensors (Episode 14). One research institute had some initial ideas about 651 a new sensor that would not only be more accurate, but also cheaper. However, it lacked an 652 opportunity for practical application in the market. On the other hand, the start-up did not have the 653 required knowledge to develop the sensor it needed. As a consequence of this mutual dependence, they 654 started a four year co-financing project "in which you have steps from 10, 25, 50, and were no exceptions to these terms possible. The contribution from the research institute is funded from 658 taxes, and the European legislation regarding state aid prohibits any deviations from the percentage 659 ratios. The start-up complied with these terms because it appeared that existing sensors, which were 660 used in the previous trials, were not sufficiently accurate. 661 662
As shown in Episode 15, an issue between the start-up and the research institute arose in 2013. After 663 starting the relationship with the start-up, the research institute embarked on a multi-partner research 664 program with similar goals. As the research institute perceived this project to be more efficient and 665 less uncertain, the research institute requested the start-up to end the co-financing project, and to join 666 the multi-partner research program. However, the terms of the research program were quite different 667 from those of the co-financing project. The multi-partner program would enable the start-up to divide 668 the costs of the project among several project members, but all members would be entitled to use the 669 patent without paying a licence fee. Yet the start-up wanted the exclusive rights to the patent that 670
would have been the result of the co-financing project first. However, the research institute did not 671 agree to this request because the existence of a better alternative substantially reduced their 672 dependence on the start-up. Nevertheless, the research institute was legally obliged to comply with the 673 current contract for as long as the start-up does not agree to suspend it. The re-negotiations took about 674 a one-and-a-half years, and in that time the progress of the joint project slowed down substantially. As 675 the angel investor explained: "it [the research institute] has just been obstructing us [the start-up] to 676 exert pressure to join the multi-partner program. We said we will not do that… It used all the tools to 677 obstruct us." Although the delay did not threaten the development of the fourth prototype, the 678 renegotiations cost the start-up precious resources. 679 680
By the end of 2014, the health foundation proposed a solution to the issue between the start-up and 681 research institute (Episode 13 and 16). At the same time, this would solve the struggle between the 682 start-up and the health foundation. The multi-partner program of the research institute needed 683 knowledge that exclusively belonged to the start-up. Thus, the multi-partner program was not able to 684 succeed without its involvement. The health foundation was one of the partners in the multi-partner 685 program, and it wanted the multi-partner program to succeed. Therefore, it proposed to finance part of 686 the start-up's co-financing project with the research institute up to the point to which they could apply 687 for a patent. The condition of this funding was that the start-up would join the multi-partner research 688 program after the patent application. This solution appeared to be a potential win-win-win situation for 689 all three partners. The solution would enable improvement first in the 'co-financing project' and later 690 also in the multi-partner program. In the words of the entrepreneur: "for everyone it is an opportunity 691 to start over with new courage." 692 693
Market leader 694
In 2012, the start-up won the audience award of the health foundation (Episode 17). This award 695 generated a lot of media attention. In this way, the project was picked up by a market leader in the 696 diabetes device market. After negotiating the agreements, the start-up and the market leader signed 697 several contracts, such as a Non-Disclosure Agreement and Right-of-First-Refusal. They agreed that 698 aim of the relationship at this stage was mainly to explore the possibilities for more intensive 699 collaboration. The start-up actually wanted more from the start, such as an investment or joint 700 development program. However, the market leader did not fully agree because the risk that the 701 artificial pancreas would fail was still perceived to be unacceptably high. Yet both partners believed 702 that their mutual dependency could be a good basis for further more intensive collaboration. During 703 such collaboration, the start-up could benefit from the production, sales and distribution facilities of 704 market leader, and the market leader could profit from the innovation capabilities of the start-up. 705
However, to achieve this aim the partners, especially the market leader, needed to build up a certain 706 level of trust before they would agree to a more intensive collaboration. 707 708
During the first two years of the collaboration, the market leader's confidence in the start-up's 709 capabilities grew. As the market leader explains: "this is clearly a step; we [the market leader] 710 completed the exploring. We concluded that we wanted to continue with it [the relationship with the 711 start-up]." Therefore, the market leader proposed intensifying the collaboration. Its proposal was to 712 use its new sensor in one of the next clinical trials with the artificial pancreas (Episode 18). The start-713 up agreed to this proposal because the market leader's sensor was the most efficient. As a result, the 714 new sensor from the market leader would be used in one of the trials of the start-up; in this way the 715 market leader can inexpensively test its sensor while the start-up can use the best sensor available. 716 717 ANALYSIS 718
The findings described in the previous section show that the start-up and its partners interacted in a 719 way that was predicted by the research framework described in Figure 1 . Therefore, the findings of the 720 18 interaction episodes presented previously are summarised, analysed and compared in light of the 721 research framework in this section.
723
A series of sequential episodes represent the interaction process 724 Table 4 shows that after the five episodes with a converting outcome (there are six converting 725
episodes, but only five were followed by a new episode), the start-up and its partners choose 726 acquiescence, defy and manipulate as modes of interaction in the subsequent episode. Although the 727 outcome of the previous episode was converting, they defied and manipulated when a conflict arose 728 between the partners. Yet if the partners saw an opportunity to strengthen the relationship, they 729 acquiesced. In spite of the successful grant for the European project, the relationship between the start-730 up and the software company lead to a conflict. The start-up believed that the software company had 731 worked neither efficiently nor effectively and did not expect it to do so in the future. Therefore, the 732 start-up did manipulate the software company. In addition, Table 4 shows that in the five episodes that 733 followed after an episode with an inhibiting outcome, the start-up and its partners choose to create, 734 avoid, defy and manipulate. Although the outcome of the previous episode was inhibiting, they were 735 willing to create a solution if the opportunity arose to advance the relationships in a positive direction 736 again. However, if the partners expected that the conflict would spin out of control or the situation 737
would not improve, they avoided, defied and manipulated. For example, when the start-up and the 738 health foundation applied for funding this was not granted. As a result, the start-up requested direct 739 funding from the health foundation, but this request was rejected. The frustration of the start-up caused 740 by this rejection triggered the manipulation of the health foundation by the start-up. In turn, this 741 resulted in the avoidance of the start-up by the foundation. Thus, the case analysis shows that the use 742 of a particular mode of interaction in a current episode is influenced by the outcomes of previous 743 episodes. However, the nature of the trigger also influences, even more strongly, the decision to use a 744 particular mode of interaction. 745 746
External and internal triggers that change the opportunities for future interactions
747 Table 4 shows that in four out of the six relationships, the first interaction episode starts with an 748 external trigger. In one instance, the start-up's partner initiated the first contact after publicity for the 749 start-up in the media. In another relationship, the potential partner came into contact with the start-up 750 at a a private meeting. In the other two instances, a third party influenced the relationship between the 751 start-up and a specific partner. In the relationship with the teaching hospital, the start-up was referred 752 to the head of the diabetology group by another physician, and in the relationship with the glucagon 753 company the start-up was prompted to search for a new partner because the industry player left the 754 European project. Thus, in the first interaction episode between the start-up and a specific partner an 755 external trigger often marked the beginning of the relationship. Additionally, Table 4 shows that after 756 the first episode of each relationship, interaction was triggered seven times by an external event and 757 five times by an internal event. Internally, the start-up regularly assessed the resource ties and activity 758 links with its partners. For example, the start-up perceived that the software company was not 759
delivering the required quality at the required time. Externally, alterations in the strategic context of 760 the start-up's partners triggered organisational actions; for example when the industry player decided 761 to leave the European project since it had shut down its own glucagon development project. In 762 conclusion, the results show that after the initial episode both internal and external events triggered 763 action by the start-up and its partners. 764 765
Moreover, when the nature of the triggers in Table 4 is analysed it appears that in 12 instances the 766 start-up and its partners agreed that the trigger expanded the opportunities for future interaction, while 767 in four episodes they agreed that it constrained those opportunities. In the remaining two instances: (1) 768 they did have different opinions on whether the trigger expanded or constrained the opportunities for 769 future collaboration; or (2) the trigger expanded and constrained the opportunities for future 770 interaction at the same time. For example, the research institute felt that the multi-partner program was 771 an opportunity to further develop the relationship with the start-up, while the start-up thought 772 otherwise. Furthermore, the exit of the industry player from the European project reduced the 773 possibility of collaborating with that player, but opened up opportunities to work together with another 774 partner. Therefore, the findings indicate that the actions of the start-up and its partners are triggered by 775 events that both constrain and expand opportunities for future interaction, although there can be 776 varying perspectives on the nature of the trigger. In addition, all the relationships started with 777 opportunities for collaboration, while in four relationships in a later stage events occurred that 778 inhibited further collaboration. Therefore, it can be argued that in the early stages there are always 779 opportunities to collaborate, while in later stages partners are more focused on resolving conflicts as 780 the internal and external conditions of the relationship change. 781 782
Modes of interaction to consciously affect interaction
783 Table 4 shows that both the start-up and its partners used a variety of interaction modes; they 784 acquiesced, compromised, created, avoided, defied and manipulated. Although the numbers are small, 785 the number of times that the start-up and its partners interact in a particular way can be compared. It 786 appears that the start-up and its partners were almost equally likely to compromise, create, avoid, defy 787 and manipulate. For example, the start-up avoided its partner once, while its partners used this mode 788 of interaction two times. In addition, they both used a creation mode of interaction four times. Table 4  789 indicates that a key aspect of the interaction mode 'create' is the involvement of third parties. In all 790 instances, the start-up and its partners were able to find novel, useful solutions to particular issues by 791 involving a third party into the relationship. If the start-up and its partners would not have had these 792 connections, it would have been very hard to overcome their issues. Moreover, the start-up 793 compromised three times and its partners four times. The start-up negotiated with the teaching 794 hospital, the health foundation and the market leader the terms of their collaboration cooperatively.
795
Only the start-up acquiesced twice as often as its partners in the interaction episodes. For instance, the 796 start-up acquiesced when the teaching hospital proposed to submit a grant proposal to gain funding 797 from the European Commission and when the market leader asked if the start-up was interested in 798 using its new sensor in the clinical trials with the artificial pancreas. To sum up, the start-up and its 799 partners both used all modes of interaction and, with the exception of acquiescence, also to roughly the 800 same extent.
802
Interaction: the action-reaction loops between counterparties 803 Table 4 shows that in seven episodes, the start-up and one of its partners used exactly the same mode 804 of interaction: create-create (three times), compromise-compromise (three times) and avoid-avoid 805 (once). In the remaining 11 episodes, the modes of interaction appeared to have the same nature in the 806 sense that: (1) the partners both followed or at least take the interests of the counterparty into account; 807 or (2) they only acted in accordance with their own interests. For example, the research institute 808 attempted to force the start-up to join the multi-partner project while the start-up challenged this 809 coercion without taking each other's interests into account. Furthermore, the partners compromised 810 over the agreements in the proposal for the grant from the European Commission, whereas the start-up 811 just complied with their propositions. Thus, there is a clear co-occurrence of interaction modes of the 812 start-up and its partners within a single episode; either the interaction mode was exactly the same or 813 had the same nature. In addition, Table 4 shows that at the beginning in three out of the six 814 relationships the modes of interaction were acquiescing or compromising followed by defiance, 815 T.Oukes & A. von Raesfeld avoidance or manipulation in later stages and subsequently creation. For example, the research 816 institute and the start-up initiated the relationship because the institute had the knowledge to develop a 817 new, better sensor while the start-up had the ability to commercialise it. Yet when the research 818 institute started the multi-partner program a conflict arose about the transfer of the start-up to that 819 program leading to defiance and manipulation. Nevertheless, they are now creating a solution to this 820 problem by involving the health foundation. In conclusion, there appears to be a pattern in the 821 development of the start-up's and its partners' interaction modes during the relationship.
823
The outcome of interaction on the actors involved, their resources and activities
824
It can be concluded from Table 4 that in the 12 episodes perceived to expand the opportunities for 825 future interaction seven times the mode of interaction was acquiescence or compromise and had a 826 (potentially) converting outcome. For example, the use of the market leader's sensors in one of the 827 next clinical trials of the start-up can be beneficial to both. In turn, this motivated the start-up to 828 acquiesce to the request of the market leader. Furthermore, there were three episodes with an 829 inhibiting effect after the start-up and its partners acted by compromising, defying and ignoring in 830 response to an opportunity. In these instances, either one of the partners was unable to take the 831 preferred action or the interaction process was influenced by factors outside the control of both 832 partners. The health foundation was unable to act in conformity because it was restricted by its audit 833 committee from funding the development of the artificial pancreas. Also, the grant proposal of the 834 start-up and the health foundation was declined by the national government. Moreover, in the 835 remainder two episodes, the partners acted by ignorance and creation and the subsequent the outcome 836 was mixed. Additionally, in the four episodes perceived to constrain the opportunities for further 837 collaboration, the interaction outcome was twofold: (a) creative actions did solve the issue and had a 838 (potentially) converting effect; and (b) defying and manipulation caused the issue to escalate and had 839 an inhibiting effect. The same applies when the start-up and its partner did not agree whether the event 840
was positive or negative in nature. Therefore, there appears to be a close interlinkage between trigger, 841 mode of interaction, interaction and outcome. 842 843 DISCUSSION 844
The aim of this paper was to study how a start-up interacts with its partners over time in order to 845 embed itself in the established developing, producing and using setting. The investigated start-up is 846 clearly embedded in the developing setting. It built several relationships with the partners in the 847 existing diabetes device development network, such as the teaching hospital and the partners of the 848 European project. The start-up's relationships are all research and development oriented. Only 849 following the initiation of the relationship with the market leader could the start-up take its first steps 850 to become embedded in the producing and using settings. However, it still has a long way to go before 851 it can actually produce the artificial pancreas and introduce it successfully into the market. To be able 852 to become embedded in the developing setting and take the first steps into the producing and using 853 settings, the start-up needed to interact with its partners. Without this interaction the start-up would not 854 have been able to initiate, maintain and end its relationships in the pre-existing network. 855
The Results and Analysis sections show that the evolution of the interaction between the start-up and 856 its partners over time can be characterised as a sequence of interaction episodes. These episodes are 857 interlinked because the outcome of a previous episode affects the interaction in the subsequent 858 episode. Moreover, Table 4 demonstrated that within each episode the start-up and a specific partner 859 use a certain type of interaction mode -acquiesce, compromise, create, avoid, defy or manipulate -to 860 respond to an internal or external trigger. In turn, an interaction process is set in motion in which 861 action and reaction go back and forth between the partners. This interaction process results in a 862 converting, inhibiting or mixed outcome for the start-up and its partners as well as for their activities 863 and resources. To discuss each of these aspects in-depth, in this section the research questions raised 864 in the Theoretical Framework section are addressed. 865 866
A series of sequential episodes represent the interaction process
867
The first research question was formulated as: How are the interaction episodes between a start-up and 868 its partner interlinked? The analysis shows that when the previous interaction episode had a converting 869 T.Oukes & A. von Raesfeld outcome, the start-up and its partners were more likely to acquiesce and compromise during the next 870 episode. Only when a conflict between them occurred, a positive outcome of the previous interaction 871 episode led to defiance and avoidance in the next episode. When the previous interaction episode had 872 an inhibiting outcome, the start-up and its partners defy, avoid and manipulate in the current one. Only 873 when an opportunity arose that allowed the partners to create a solution, the start-up and its partners 874 acted creatively. Thus, it can be concluded from the analysis that previous episodes affect subsequent 875 episodes. This confirms that the suggestion of Medlin (2004) and others that organisations memorize 876 and interpret previous interaction episodes to decide on how to act in a subsequent episode. In 877 addition, the results showed that the start-up and its partners were influenced by future expectations 878 about the relationships. If the trigger that initiated action from either partner provided an opportunity 879 to advance the collaboration, the future expectations of the outcome of the relationship were positive. 880
In turn, the partners were more likely to acquiesce, compromise and create. However, if the trigger 881 that initiated action inhibited the opportunity to maintain or develop the collaboration, the partners had 882 negative expectations of the outcome of the relationship. As a result, the partners would be more 883 inclined to avoid, defy and manipulate. Indeed the IMP approach argues that not only history impacts 884 on the interaction in a current episode, but also the expectations about future interaction. A particular 885 action can either positively or negatively impact the economic, technical and social outcomes of the 886 interaction episode. If an organisation expects that the potential outcome will be less efficient than it 887 could be, thereby harming innovation and reducing legitimacy, then it will try to counteract the 888 outcome, and vice versa (Håkansson et al., 2009 ). 889 890
External and internal triggers that change the opportunities for future interactions
891
The second research question was: What triggers deliberate action by a start-up and its partner? The 892 analysis demonstrates that an external trigger often marked the start of the relationship. This finding is 893 similar to the results reported by Holmen et al. (2005) who found in a case study of a small Dutch 894 company that its counterparties initiated the first contact, the contact was initiated by a direct 895 counterparty or the contact was initiated at a public meeting, such as a trade show or trade fair. It may 896 be that the start-up in this case did not directly initiate a relationship with a potential partner as it had 897 only restricted attention from key decision makers in its partner's organisation. Although the 898 importance of establishing the start-up's first relationships is widely recognized (La Rocca et al., 899 2013) , research shows that start-ups often find it very difficult to contact the right individuals in a 900 potential partner's organisation (Das & He, 2006; Prashantham & Birkinshaw, 2008) . Furthermore, the 901 analysis shows that internal events were equally likely to occur as external events during the 902 relationships. This supports the findings of several authors (e.g. Ariño & de la Torre, 1998; Medlin, 903 2004) who found that organisational action is the result of incidents that occur either inside or outside 904 the interaction context. 905 906
More importantly, however, the findings reveal that action is triggered by events that expand as well 907 as constrain the opportunities for future interaction. This is in conflict with the findings of Ariño and 908 de la Torre (1998) who found that if the value from the relationship could increase then the initial 909 agreements are executed, but no re-negotiations would follow which may lead to a set of revised 910 agreements beyond the initial one. However, they did a longitudinal case study on the interaction 911 between two partners in a failed joint venture, whereas in this case all the relationships continue to 912 exist. Therefore, the difference may be explained by the fact that in successful relationships partners 913 act on opportunities for further collaboration, while in failing partnerships they do not. Another 914 explanation may be found in the focus of Ariño and de la Torre (1998) on events that triggered action 915 when the relationship was already established, while this paper also included the initial interaction 916 episodes in the analysis. The results show that in the early stages there are always opportunities to 917 expand the collaboration. In contrast, in later stages partners have to resolve conflicts as a result of 918 changes in the internal and external conditions of the relationship. Therefore, it may be that Ariño and 919 de la Torre (1998) would have identified events expanding the opportunities for future collaboration 920 that actually triggered action if they would have researched the partners' interaction from the start of 921 the relationship. Taken together, these findings imply that the ultimate success or failure -as well as 922 the stage of a relationship -is important to the nature of the triggers that occur. 923 924
